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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles are complex systems that are
challenging to test and debug. A requirements-driven approach
to the development process can decrease the resources required
to design and test these systems, while simultaneously increasing
the reliability. We present a testing framework that uses signal
temporal logic (STL), which is a precise and unambiguous
requirements language. Our framework evaluates test cases
against the STL formulae and additionally uses the requirements
to automatically discover test cases that fail to satisfy the
requirements. One of the key features of our tool is the support
for machine learning (ML) components in the system design, such
as deep neural networks. The framework allows evaluation of
the control algorithms, including the ML components, and it also
includes models of CCD camera, lidar, and radar sensors, as well
as the vehicle environment. We use multiple methods to generate
test cases, including covering arrays, which is an efficient method
to search discrete variable spaces. The resulting test cases can
be used to debug the controller design by identifying controller
behaviors that do not satisfy requirements. The test cases can also
enhance the testing phase of development by identifying critical
corner cases that correspond to the limits of the system’s allowed
behaviors. We present STL requirements for an autonomous
vehicle system, which capture both component-level and system-
level behaviors. Additionally, we present three driving scenarios
and demonstrate how our requirements-driven testing framework
can be used to identify critical system behaviors, which can be
used to support the development process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous driving systems are in a stage of rapid research
and development spanning a broad range of maturity from
simulations to on-road testing and deployment. They are
expected to have a significant impact on the vehicle market
and the broader economy and society in the future.
Testing of highly automated and autonomous driving sys-
tems is also an area of active research. Both governmental
and non-governmental organizations are grappling with the
unique requirements of these new, highly complex systems,
as they have to operate safely and reliably in diverse driving
environments. Government and industry sponsored partner-
ships have produced a number of guiding documents and
clarifications, such as NHTSA [1], SAE [2], CAMP [3], NCAP
[4], PEGASUS [5]. The research community has also been
contributing to the development of methodologies for testing
automated driving systems.
Stellet et al. [6] surveyed existing approaches to testing
such as simulation-only, X-in-the-loop and augmented reality
approaches, as well as test criteria and metrics (see also
[7]). Koopman and Wagner identified challenges of testing
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and proposed potential solutions, such as fault injection, as
a way to perform more efficient edge case testing [8]. The
publications [9] and [10] provide in-depth discussions on
the challenges of safety validation for autonomous vehicles,
arguing that virtual testing should be the main target for both
methodological and economic reasons.
However, no universally agreed upon testing or verification
methods have yet arisen for autonomous driving systems. One
reason is that the current autonomous systems architectures
usually include some Machine Learning (ML) components,
such as Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), which are notoriously
difficult to test and verify. For instance, Automated Driving
System (ADS) designs often use ML components such as
DNNs to classify objects within CCD images and to determine
their positions relative to the vehicle, a process known as
object detection and classification [11], [12]. Other designs
use Neural Networks (NNs) to perform end-to-end control
of the vehicle, meaning that the NN takes in the image data
and outputs actuator commands, without explicitly performing
an intermediate object detection step [13], [14], [15]. Still
other approaches use end-to-end learning to do intermediate
decisions like risk assessment [16].
ML system components are problematic from an analysis
perspective, as it is difficult or impossible to characterize all
of the behaviors of these components under all circumstances.
One reason is that the complexity of these systems can be
very high in terms of the number of parameters. For example,
AlexNet [17], a pre-trained DNN that is used for classification
of CCD images, has 60 million parameters. Another reason for
the difficulty in characterizing behaviors of ML components is
that the parameters are learned based on training data. In other
words, characterizing ML behaviors is, in some ways, as diffi-
cult as the task of characterizing the training data. Again using
the AlexNet example, the number of training images used was
1.2 million. While the main strength of DNNs is their ability to
generalize from training data, the major challenge for analysis
is that we do not understand well how they generalize to all
possible cases. Therefore, there has been significant interest
on verification and testing for ML components. For example,
adversarial testing approaches seek to identify perturbations
in image data that result in misclassifications [18], [19], [20].
However, most of the existing work on testing and verification
of systems with ML components focuses only on the ML
components themselves, without consideration of the closed-
loop behavior of the system.
The closed-loop nature of a typical autonomous driving
system can be described as follows. A perception system
processes data gathered from various sensing devices, such
as cameras, lidar, and radar. The output of the perception
system is an estimation of the principal (ego) vehicle’s position
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with respect to external obstacles (e.g., other vehicles, called
agent vehicles, and pedestrians). A path planning algorithm
uses the output of the perception system to produce a short-
term plan for how the ego vehicle should behave. A tracking
controller then takes the output of the path planner and
produces actuation outputs, such as accelerator, braking, and
steering commands. The actuation commands affect the vehi-
cle’s interaction with the environment. The iterative process
of sensing, processing, and actuating is what we refer to as
closed-loop behavior.
It is important to note that by design, closed-loop systems
have error tolerance mechanisms. Hence, adversarial attacks
that work on individual ML components may not the same
effect on the closed loop system. Since for ADS applications
the ultimate goal is to evaluate the closed-loop system per-
formance, any testing methods used to evaluate such systems
should support this goal.
We present a framework for Simulation-based Adversarial
Testing of Autonomous Vehicles (Sim-ATAV), which can be
used to check closed-loop properties of ADS that include ML
components. In particular, our work focuses on methods to
determine perturbations in the configuration of a test scenario,
meaning that we seek to find scenarios that lead to unexpected
behaviors, such as misclassifications and ultimately vehicle
collisions. The framework that we present allows this type
of testing in a virtual environment. By utilizing advanced 3D
models and image rendering tools, such as the ones used in
game engines, the gap between testing in a virtual environment
and the real world can be minimized. We describe a testing
methodology, based on a test case generation method, called
covering arrays [21], and requirement falsification methods
[22] to automatically identify problematic test scenarios. The
resulting framework can be used to increase the reliability of
autonomous driving systems.
An earlier version of this work appeared in [23]. The
contributions of that work can be summarized as follows. In
[23], we provided a new algorithm to perform falsification of
formal requirements for an autonomous vehicle in a closed-
loop with the perception system, which includes an efficient
means of searching over discrete and continuous parameter
spaces. The method represents a new way to do adversarial
testing in scenario configuration space, as opposed to the
usual method, which considers adversaries in image space.
Additionally, we demonstrated a new way to characterize prob-
lems with perception systems in configuration space. Lastly,
we extended the software testing theory of covering arrays
to closed-loop Cyber-Physical System (CPS) applications that
have embedded ML algorithms.
The present paper provides the following contributions that
are in addition to those from [23]:
• We add models of lidar and radar sensors and include
sensor fusion algorithms, and we demonstrate how the
requirements-based testing framework we propose can be
used to automate the search for specific types of fault
cases involving sensor interactions.
• We provide requirements for both component-level and
system-level behaviors, and we show how to automate
the identification of behaviors where component-level
failures lead to system-level failures. An example of the
kind of analysis this allows is automatically finding cases
where a sensor failure leads to a collision case.
• We include a model of agent visibility to various sensors
and include this notion in the requirements that we
consider. This provides a way to reason about how the
system should behave, based on whether agents are or
are not visible, including the ability to reason about the
temporal aspects of agent visibility. For example, we
can use this feature to test the requirement that within
1 second after an agent becomes visible to the lidar
sensor, the perception system should correctly classify the
agent. This allows us to automate the search for behaviors
related to temporal aspects of sensor behaviors in the
context of a realistic driving scenario.
• We demonstrate the ability to falsify properties by ad-
versarially searching over agent trajectories. This permits
the use of our requirements-driven search-based approach
over a broad class of agent behaviors, which allows us
to automatically identify corner cases that are difficult to
find using traditional simulation-based techniques.
• We have released a publicly available toolbox Sim-ATAV
as an add-on to the S-TaLiRo falsification toolbox for
Matlabr [24]: https://sites.google.com/a/asu.edu/s-taliro/
s-taliro/sim-atav
II. RELATED WORK
Testing and evaluation methods for Autonomous1 Vehicles
(AVs) could be categorized into three major classes: (1) model
based, (2) data-driven, and (3) scenario based. Scenario-based
approaches utilize accident reports and driving conditions that
are easily identifiable as challenging, producing specific test
scenarios to be executed either in the real world or in a
simulation environment. For example, Euro NCAP [4] and
DOT [25] provide such scenarios. Data-driven approaches, on
the other hand, typically utilize driving data [26] to generate
probabilistic models of human drivers. Such models are then
used for risk assessment and rare event sampling for AV
algorithms under specific driving scenarios [27].
The aforementioned testing methods are important and
necessary before AV deployment, but they cannot help with
design exploration and automated fault detection at early
development stages. Such problems are addressed by model-
based verification [28], [29], model based test generation
[30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], or a combination
thereof [37], [38]. It is important to also highlight that these
methods typically ignore or use simple models to abstract
away proximity sensors and, especially, the vision systems.
However, ignoring sensors or using simplified sensing models
may be a dangerously simplifying assumption since it ignores
the complex interactions between the dynamics of the vehicle
and the sensors. For example, the effective sensing range of a
sensor platform mounted on the roof of a vehicle is affected
when the vehicle makes hard turns.
1We utilize the more general term “autonomous” as opposed to a more
restricted “automated” since our methods could potentially apply to all levels
of autonomy.
In addition, vision-based perception systems have become
an integral component of the sensor platform of AVs, and
in many cases, they constitute the only perception system.
Currently, the winning algorithmic technology for image pro-
cessing systems is utilizing DNNs. For instance, by 2011, the
DNN architecture proposed in [39] was already capable of
classifying pre-segmented images of traffic signs with better
accuracy than humans (99.46% vs 99.22%). Since then, there
has been substantial progress with DNNs performing both
segmentation and classification [40], [41]. Yet, in spite of the
multiple impressive results using DNNs, it is still also easy to
devise methods that can produce (so-called adversarial) images
that will fool them [18], [19].
The latter (negative) result raises two important questions:
(1) can we still generate adversarial inputs for DNNs when
we manipulate the physical properties and trajectories of the
objects in the environment of the AV, and (2) how does the
DNN accuracy affect the system level properties of an AV,
that is, its functional safety? Exhaustive verification methods
for DNNs in-the-loop are still in their infancy [42], and they
cannot handle AVs with DNN components in the loop. To
address the two questions above, several model-based test gen-
eration methods have been proposed [43], [44], [45], [23]. The
procedure described in [43], [44] analyzes the performance of
the perception system using static images to identify candidate
counterexamples, which are then checked using simulations of
the closed-loop system to determine whether the AV exhibits
unsafe behaviors. On the other hand, [45], [23] develop
methods that directly search for unsafe behaviors of the closed-
loop system by defining a cost function on the closed-loop
behaviors. The differences between [45] and [23] are primarily
on the search methods, the simulation environments, and
the AVs, with [23] providing a more efficient method for
combinatorial search.
In this extended version of [23], we take the system-level
adversarial test generation methods for AV one step further.
We demonstrate that our framework [23] can be extended for
test generation for AV with multi-sensor systems as opposed
to vision-only perception systems. Moreover, we demonstrate
the importance and effectiveness of test generation methods
guided by system-level requirements as well as perception-
level requirements.
Using our framework, we can formalize and test against
requirements on the sensor performance in the context of a
driving scenario. For example, the lidar’s point cloud density
drops significantly with the distance to the target object, for
example, a pedestrian. Similar to this aspect of lidar behavior,
the pixel count of a CCD camera would also decrease dramat-
ically with the distance if it were to be used for pedestrian
detection, since the area of an observed object decreases as
the square of the distance to the object. This may complicate
testing for long-range observation conditions. Our framework
supports testing these aspects of sensor performance.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the setting used to describe the testing
procedures performed with our framework. The purpose of
our framework is to provide a mechanism to test, evaluate,
and improve on an autonomous driving system design. To
do this, we use a simulation environment that incorporates
models of a vehicle (called the ego vehicle), a perception
system, which is used to estimate the state of the vehicle
with respect to other objects in its environment, a controller,
which makes decisions about how the vehicle will behave, and
the environment in which the ego vehicle is deployed. The
environment model contains representations of a wide variety
of objects that can interact with the ego vehicle, including
roads, buildings, pedestrians, and other vehicles (called agent
vehicles). The behaviors of the system are determined by the
evolution of the model states over time, which we compute
using a simulator.
In the following, R represents the set of real numbers, while
Z the set of integers. In addition, R = R ∪ {±∞} and R≥0
is the set of positive reals. Formally, we assume that a test
scenario Σ is captured by a simulation function sim : X0 ×
U × P × R≥0 → Y that maps a vector of initial conditions
x0 ∈ X0, a vector of parameters p ∈ P , a total simulation
time T ∈ R≥0 and a time stamped input signal u ∈ U to a
time stamped output signal y ∈ Y.
Here, X0 ⊆ Rnx1 ×Znx2 is the set of initial conditions for the
whole scenario, i.e., for the ego vehicle(s) as well as any other
stateful object in the environment. The variable nx1 captures the
number of the continuous-valued state variables in the system
(i.e., the order of the differential and/or difference equations),
and nx2 captures the number of discrete-valued (and, primarily,
finite-valued) state variables in the system. In other words,
we assume that the models we consider are hybrid dynamical
systems [46]. Similarly, P ⊆ Rnp1 × Znp2 is a set of np1
continuous-valued parameters, such as ambient temperature,
light intensity, or color, and np2 discrete-valued (categorical)
parameters, such as vehicle model or sign type.
The set of potential input values is denoted by U ⊆ Rmin ,
where min is the number of time varying input signals to the
test scenario. The set of possible input signals is U = (U ×
R≥0)Nin+1, where Nin is the number of samples for the input
signal. In other words, an input signal (also referred to as input
trace) u ∈ U is a function u : {0, 1, . . . , Nin} → U × R≥0
which maps each sample i to an input value ui ∈ U and a
time stamp ti ∈ R≥0. Alternatively, we can view u as a finite
sequence of input signal values and their corresponding times:
u = (u0, t0)(u1, t1) · · · (uNin , tNin).
Here, we make two assumptions : (i) tNin is no greater than
the simulation time T (i.e., tNin ≤ T ), and (ii) the timestamps
are monotonically increasing: ∀i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nin}, if i < j,
then ti < tj . Finally, since the simulator may need to produce
output values at some time t between two timestamps (i.e.,
t ∈ (ti, ti+1)), we will assume that the simulator decides what
interpolation function it will use.
Given initial conditions x0 ∈ X0, parameter values p ∈ P ,
input signals u ∈ U, and the total simulation time T , the
simulator returns an output trajectory (also referred to as
output trace) y = sim(x0,u, p, T ). The output trace is a
function y : {0, 1, . . . , Nout} → Y × R≥0 that maps each
sample i to an output value yi ∈ Y ⊆ Rmout and a time
𝑣ሺ௘ሻ 𝑣ሺ௔ሻ
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Fig. 1: The simple test scenario of Example 1.
stamp ti ∈ R≥0. Here, mout is the number of observable
output variables. We denote the set of possible output traces
by Y = (Y × R≥0)Nout . The output trace timestamps should
satisfy (i) tNout = T , and (ii) the monotonicity property.
For notational convenience, we will make an additional
assumption that the simulator also returns an updated input
trace u where N = Nin = Nout and the timestamps of
y and u match. We refer to the triple σ = (y,u, p) as a
simulation trace, which can also be viewed as a function
σ : {0, 1, . . . , Nout} → Y × U × P × R≥0, or as a sequence
(recall that p is constant):
σ = (y0, u0, p, t0)(y1, u1, p, t1) · · · (yN , uN , p, tN ).
We denote the set of all simulation traces σ of Σ by L(Σ).
Remark 1: In this paper, the function sim is assumed
to be deterministic; however, the results we present are also
applicable to stochastic systems (i.e., when the sim function
is stochastic). See [47] for a discussion.
Example 1: We will present a simple illustrative example to
clarify the notation. Let’s assume a test scenario as in Fig. 1.
For i ∈ {a, e}, we will denote by z(i) the longitudinal position
of the vehicle i and by v(i) the velocity of the vehicle i. The
ego vehicle (e) implements an adaptive cruise control (ACC)
algorithm, which we treat as a black box: η˙(e) = fe(η(e), η(a)),
where η(i) = [z(i) v(i)]T . In this simple model of an ego car,
the ego car senses its environment by measuring the state η(a)
of the adversarial agent. The adversarial agent (a) has simple
integrator dynamics z˙(a) = µv(a) and v˙(a) = ξ (with the
additional constraint of no negative velocity, i.e., v(t) ≥ 0),
where ξ and µ are the time varying inputs that we search over,
i.e., u = [ξ µ]T . In particular, µ(t) ∈ {1, 2} models the normal
versus the sport driving mode in the powertrain (selected by
the driver), while ξ(t) = [−1, 1] is the acceleration (and
braking) input also provided by the driver of the adversarial
vehicle. Assuming Nin = 201, then U = ([−1, 1]×{1, 2})201
– see Fig. 2 for an example input. In this test scenario, the
state space is x = [z(e) v(e) z(a) v(a)]T and, thus X0 is
the set of initial positions z(i) and velocities v(i) of the two
vehicles. The set of parameters is empty since this test scenario
does not have any constant parameters. The output trace is
defined to be the positions of the two vehicles over time, i.e.,
y = [z(e) z(a)]T . Fig. 3 presents the vehicle positions over
time for the inputs in Fig. 2. It can be observed that the ego
vehicle does not utilize a safe ACC since it collides with the
adversarial vehicle at about time 4.
A. Signal Temporal Logic
Signal Temporal Logic (STL) was introduced as a syntactic
extension to Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) to reason about
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Fig. 2: Input trace u for the test scenario of Example 1.
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Fig. 3: Output trace y for the test scenario of Example 1.
real-time properties of signals (simulation traces) (for an
overview see [48]). STL formulae are built over predicates on
the variables of a signal using Boolean and temporal operators.
The temporal operators include eventually (♦I), always (I)
and until (UI), where I is a time interval that encodes
timing constraints. The boolean operators include conjunction
∧, disjunction ∨, negation ¬, and implication =⇒ .
In this work, we interpret STL formulas over the observable
simulation traces. STL specifications can describe the usual
properties of interest in system design such as (bounded time)
reachability, for example, eventually, between time 1.2 and 5
(not including), y should drop below −10: ♦[1.2,5) (y ≤ −10),
and safety, for example, after time 2 time units, y should
always be greater than 10: [2,+∞)(y ≥ 10). An important
class of expressible requirements in STL are reactive require-
ments, such as ((y ≤ −10)→ ♦[0,2](y ≥ 10)), which states
that whenever y drops below -10, then within 2 time units y
should rise above 10.
Informally speaking, we allow predicate expressions to
capture arbitrary constraints over the output variables, inputs,
and parameters of the system. More formally, we assume
that predicates pi are expressions built using the grammar
pi ::= f(y, u, p) ≥ c | ¬pi1 | (pi) | pi1 ∨ pi2 | pi1 ∧ pi2,
where f is a function and c is a constant in R. In other words,
each predicate pi represents a subset in the space Y ×U ×P .
In the following, we represent the set that corresponds to
the predicate pi using the notation O(pi). For example, if
pi = (y(1) ≤ −10) ∨ (y(1) + y(2) ≥ 10) where y(i) is the i-th
component of the vector y, then O(pi) = (∞,−10]×R∪{y ∈
R2 | y(1) + y(2) ≥ 10}.
Definition 1 (STL Syntax): Assume Π is the set of predicates
and I is any non-empty connected interval of R≥0. The set of
all well-formed STL formulas is inductively defined as ϕ ::=
> | pi | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | © φ | φ1UIφ2, where pi is a predicate,
> is true, © is Next, and UI is the Until operator.
In this work, we will be using discrete time semantics of
STL since we would like to be able to reason about the timing
of samples and define events as falling or raising Boolean
values using the next time operator (©). For example, the
formula pi ∧©¬pi expresses an event (e.g., high to low). For
STL formulas ψ, φ, we define ψ∧φ ≡ ¬(¬ψ∨¬φ), ⊥ ≡ ¬>
(False), ψ → φ ≡ ¬ψ ∨ φ (ψ Implies φ), ♦Iψ ≡ >UIψ
(Eventually ψ), Iψ ≡ ¬♦I¬ψ (Always ψ), and ψRIφ ≡
¬(¬ψUI¬φ) (ψ Releases φ), using syntactic manipulation.
In our previous work [49], we proposed robust semantics
for STL formulas. Robust semantics (or robustness metrics)
provide a real-valued measure of satisfaction of a formula by
a trace. In contrast, Boolean semantics just provide a true or
false valuation. In more detail, given a trace σ of the system,
its robustness w.r.t. a temporal property ϕ, denoted [[ϕ]]d(σ),
yields a positive value if σ satisfies ϕ and a negative value
otherwise. Moreover, if the trace σ satisfies the specification
φ, then the robust semantics evaluate to the radius of a
neighborhood such that any other trace that remains within
that neighborhood also satisfies the same specification. The
same holds for traces that do not satisfy φ. In order to define
neighborhoods for requirement satisfaction, we need to utilize
metrics over the space of outputs, inputs and parameters.
Definition 2 (Metric): A metric on a set S is a positive
function d : S × S → R≥0 such that
I. ∀s, s′ ∈ S, d(s, s′) = 0⇔ s = s′
II. ∀s, s′ ∈ S, d(s, s′) = d(s′, s)
III. ∀s, s′, s′′ ∈ S, d(s, s′′) ≤ d(s, s′) + d(s′, s′′)
In this paper, all the experimental results were derived using
the Euclidean metric, i.e., d(s, s′) = ‖s − s′‖; however, any
other metric could be used. Using a metric, we can define a
distance function that will capture how robustly a point belongs
to a set. That is, the further away a point is from the boundary
of the set, the more robust is its membership in that set.
Definition 3 (Signed Distance [50] §8): Let s ∈ S be a
point, A ⊆ S be a set and d be a metric on S. Then, we
define the Signed Distance from s to A to be
Distd(s,A) :=
{ − inf{d(s, s′) | s′ ∈ A} if s 6∈ A
inf{d(s, s′) | s′ 6∈ A} if s ∈ A
That is, the signed distance is positive if the point is in the
set and negative otherwise.
Definition 4 (STL Robust Semantics): Given a metric d, trace
σ , and O : Π→ 2Y×U×P , the robust semantics of any formula
φ w.r.t σ at time instance i ∈ N is defined as:
[[>]]d(σ, i) := +∞
[[pi]]d(σ, i) :=Distd([yi ui pi]
T ,O(pi))
[[¬φ]]d(σ, i) :=− [[φ]]d(σ, i)
[[φ1 ∨ φ2]]d(σ, i) := max
(
[[φ1]]d(σ, i), [[φ2]]d(σ, i)
)
[[©φ]]d(σ, i) :=
{
[[φ]]d(σ, i+ 1) if i+ 1 ∈ N
−∞ otherwise
[[φ1UIφ2]]d(σ, i) := max
j s.t. (tj−ti)∈I
(
min
(
[[φ2]]d(σ, j),
min
i≤k<j
[[φ1]]d(σ, k)
))
The value [[φ]]d(σ, 0) is referred to as the robustness with
which σ satisfies φ. For convenience, we just write [[φ]]d(σ)
when i = 0. As proved in [49], a trace σ satisfies an STL
Fig. 4: The resulting robustness landscape (heatmap) for
specification ϕ in Example 2. The initial positions for the two
vehicles and the input µ are fixed. The input signals for ξ are
generated by linear interpolation between two input values:
ξstart at time 0 and ξend at time 10.
formula φ (denoted by σ |= φ), if [[φ]]d(σ) > 0. On the other
hand, a trace σ ′ does not satisfy φ (denoted by σ ′ 6|= φ), if
[[φ]]d(σ
′) < 0. An overview of the algorithms that can be used
to compute [[ϕ]]d is provided in [48].
Example 2 (Continued from Example 1): Let’s assume that
we would like to check on the output traces of Fig. 3 the simple
safety requirement: after 5 time units, the distance between
the adversarial and ego vehicles should always be greater
than 0. This requirement is captured by the STL specification
ϕ = [5,∞)(y(a) − y(e) > 0). Then, [[ϕ]]d(σ) = −1.0841,
which means that the requirement is not satisfied. Moreover,
the value -1.0841 corresponds to time 5.2446, which is the
time of the worst violation of φ1.
B. Robustness-Guided Falsification
The robustness metric can be viewed as a fitness function
that indicates the degree to which individual simulations of
the system satisfy the requirement ϕ (positive values indicate
that the simulation satisfies ϕ). Therefore, for a given system
Σ and a given requirement ϕ, the verification problem is to
ensure that for all σ ∈ L(Σ), [[ϕ]]d(σ) > 0.
Let ϕ be a given STL property that the system is expected
to satisfy. The robustness metric [[ϕ]]d maps each simulation
trace σ to a real number r (see Fig. 4 for an example).
Ideally, for the STL verification problem, we would like to
prove that infσ∈L(Σ)[[ϕ]]d(σ) > ε > 0 where ε is a desired
robustness threshold. Unfortunately, in general, the problem
is not algorithmically solvable [51], that is, there does not
exist an algorithm that can solve the problem. Hence, instead
of trying to prove that the property holds on the system, we
will try to demonstrate that it does not hold on the system
when the system is unsafe. In other words, we are searching
for a trajectory (trace) which falsifies the requirement (i.e., a
trace that demonstrates that the specification is false). This is
the topic of the next section.
C. Falsification and Critical System Behaviors
In this work, we focus on the task of identifying critical
system behaviors, including falsifying traces. To identify fal-
sifying system behaviors, we leverage existing work on falsifi-
cation, which is the process of identifying system traces σ that
do not satisfy a given specification ϕ. The STL falsification
problem is defined as: Find σ ∈ L(Σ) s.t. [[ϕ]]d(σ) < 0. One
successful approach in addressing the falsification problem is
to pose it as a global non-linear optimization problem:
σ? = arg min
σ∈L(Σ)
[[ϕ]]d(σ). (1)
If the global optimization algorithm converges to some local
minimizer σ˜ such that [[ϕ]]d(σ˜) < 0, then a counterexample
(adversarial sample) has been identified, which can be used
for debugging (or for training). Considering the robustness
heatmap in Fig. 4, any point with robustness below 0 would be
a counterexample for the specification of Example 2. In order
to solve this non-linear non-convex optimization problem, a
number of stochastic search optimization methods can be
applied (e.g., [22] – for an overview see [52], [53]). We
leverage existing falsification methods to identify falsifying
examples the autonomous driving system.
D. Covering Arrays
In software systems, there can often be a large number of
discrete input parameters that affect the execution path of a
program and its outputs. The possible combinations of input
values can grow exponentially with the number of parameters.
Hence, exhaustive testing on the input space becomes imprac-
tical for fairly large systems. A fault in such a system with
k parameters may be caused by a specific combination of t
parameters, where 1 ≤ t ≤ k. One best-effort approach to
testing is to make sure that all combinations of any t-sized
subset (i.e., all t-way combinations) of the inputs are tested.
A covering array is a minimal number of test cases such
that any t-way combination of test parameters exist in the
list [21]. Covering arrays are generated using optimization-
based algorithms with the goal of minimizing the number of
test cases. We denote a t-way covering array on k parameters
by CA(t, k, (v1, ..., vk)), where vi is the number of possible
values for the ith parameter. The size of the covering array
increases with increasing t, and it becomes an exhaustive list
of all combinations when t = k. Here, t is considered as the
strength of the covering array. In practice, t can be chosen such
that the generated tests fit into the testing budget. Empirical
studies on real-world examples show that more than 90 percent
of the software failures can be found by testing 2 to 4-way
combinations of inputs [54].
Despite the t-way combinatorial coverage guaranteed by
covering arrays, a fault in the system possibly may arise
as a result of a combination of a number of parameters
larger than t. Hence, covering arrays are typically used to
supplement additional testing techniques, like uniform random
sampling (fuzzing). We consider that because of the nature of
the training data or the network structure, NN-based object
detection algorithms may be sensitive to a certain combination
of properties of the objects in the scene. Fig. 5 shows outputs
of a DNN-based object detection and classification algorithm
for 4 different combinations of vehicle type, vehicle color and
pedestrian pants color while all other parameters like position
and orientation of the objects are the same. In a comparison
between configurations (a) and (b), the vehicle type does not
change but the vehicle and pedestrian pants colors change
from blue to white. While both the car and the pedestrian
are detected in configuration (a), the pedestrian is detected
but the car is not detected in configuration (b); however, in a
comparison between configurations (b) and (d), if we fix the
vehicle and pedestrian pants colors to be white but change the
vehicle type, then the car is detected but the pedestrian is not
detected. We can also see that the size of the detection box
is different between configurations (c) and (d), for which the
vehicle type is the same but the vehicle and pedestrian pants
colors are different. Our observation is that the characterization
of the errors is generally not as simple as saying that all white
colored cars are not detected. Instead, the errors arise from
some combination of subsets of discrete parameters. Because
of this combinatorial aspect of the problem, covering arrays is
a good fit to test DNN-based object detection and classification
algorithms. In Sec. V, we describe how Sim-ATAV combines
covering arrays to explore discrete and discretized parameters
with falsification on continuous parameters.
IV. REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we provide five STL requirements intended
for the autonomous driving system. Each requirement is used
to target specific aspects of safety and performance. Also, we
describe how analysis results related to each of the require-
ments can be used to enhance either the controller design or
a testing phase of the development process.
A. STL Requirements
This section describes each of the requirements that we
use in the sequel to evaluate an ADS design with our virtual
framework. We provide these requirements to illustrate how
STL can be used to describe four different types of behavior
expectations for an ADS: system-level safety, subsystem-level
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Fig. 5: Specific configurations impacting DNN performance.
performance, subsystem-to-system safety, and system-level
performance (driving comfort) requirements. In the following,
when an object i and a sensor s are clear from the context,
we will drop the indices from the notation.
Requirement R1: The ego vehicle should not collide with
an object.
This requirement is an example of a system-level safety
requirement. It is used to ensure that the ego vehicle does not
collide with any object in the environment. Behaviors that do
not satisfy this requirement correspond to unsafe performance
by the AV. These cases are valuable to identify in simulation,
as they can be communicated back to the control designers so
that the control algorithms can be improved.
The formal requirement in STL is:
R1i = (¬pii,coll)
where pii,coll = dist(i, ego) < dist.
In the above specification, i corresponds to an object in
the environment, such as an agent vehicle or a pedestrian.
dist(i, ego) gives the minimum Euclidean distance between
the boundaries of the Ego vehicle and the boundaries of
object i. The specification basically indicates that the Ego
vehicle should not collide with object i.
In practice, we consider a separate requirement for each
object in the environment and all of them are checked con-
junctively, i.e., if there are Mo objects, then R1 =
∧Mo
i=1R1i.
Remark 2: As we have indicated in [30], [31], R1 can
be too restrictive and pessimistic for an adversarial testing
environment. Namely, if the requirement simply states “do not
collide with a moving object”, then the test engine will attempt
to generate agent trajectories that purposefully try to collide
with the ego vehicle. If the adversaries are powerful enough,
then the ego vehicle cannot avoid such collision cases. Hence,
depending on the test scenario it may be necessary to enforce
R1 only for static objects, or impose additional assumptions
formalizing when the ego vehicle is supposed to be able avoid
collisions, e.g., [55], [28].
Requirement R2: Sensor s should detect visible obstacles
within t1 time units.
This requirement is an example of a subsystem-level re-
quirement. This particular example can be considered as a
requirement on the sensor or perception subsystems. The
requirement indicates that the perception system or a specific
sensor s should not fail to detect an object for an excessive
amount of time, i.e., more than t1 time.
The requirement is as follows.
R2i,s = 
(
(W (i, s) ∧ ¬D(i, s)) =⇒
♦[0,t1](D(i, s) ∨ ¬W (i, s))
)
Here, W (i, s) denotes that object i is physically
visible to sensor s. For our framework, s ∈
{CCD, lidar, radar, combined}, where combined represents
the total perception system, that is, fusion of all available
sensors. The predicate D(i, s) evaluates to true when
sensor s detects object i. A (non-unique) description of this
requirement in natural language is “it is always true that for
any time when object i is visible and not detected by sensor
s, then there exists a time instant between 0 and t1 that object
i is either detected or it should be invisible to the sensor”.
Requirement R3: Localization errors should not be too
large for too long.
This requirement is another sensor-level requirement and
specifies that the localization of an object that is based on a
particular sensor should provide sufficient accuracy, within an
adequate time after the object becomes visible to the sensor:
R3i,s =
(
(W (i, s) ∧ (¬D(i, s) ∨ E(i, s) > err)) =⇒
♦[0,t1](¬W (i, s) ∨ (D(i, s) ∧ E(i, s) < err))
)
In R3i,s, E(i, s) is the difference between object i’s location
and its location as estimated using information from sensor
s. The constant err is a threshold on the acceptable error
between the actual position of i and its estimated position.
To understand the requirement, consider the situation where
either an object is not detected (i.e., ¬D(i, s)) or there is a
large error in the localization of the object (i.e., E(i, s) >
err), we refer to this case as “poor detection” of the object.
We can interpret the requirement as follows: “it is always true
that whenever object i is visible to sensor s and is poorly
detected by sensor s, then there exists an instant, within a time
period from 0 to t1, that either object i is invisible to sensor s
or the object is detected and the localization error is small, as
computed using information from sensor s”. This requirement
basically limits the amount of time the sensor error can be
greater than a given threshold.
Requirement R4: A sensor-related fault should not lead
to a system-level fault.
This is an example of a subsystem-to-system requirement.
This requirement relates sensor-level behaviors to system-level
behaviors. The purpose is to isolate behaviors where a sensor
fault results in a collision. The expectation is that the system
as a whole should be robust to failure of a single sensor:
R4i,s =¬
(
[0,t1]
(¬pii,coll ∧W (i, s)∧
(¬D(i, s) ∨ E(i, s) > err)
) ∧ ♦(t1,t2]pii,coll)
The above requirement designates that there should not be a
period of t1 where a visible object is not accurately detected
and no collision occurs, followed immediately by a period
of length t2 − t1 that contains a collision. In other words,
the requirement indicates that a system level fault (collision)
should not occur within a short time after a sensor fault. A
behavior that violates this requirement does not necessarily
indicate that the sensor fault caused the system fault, but
it suggests a correlation, as it points to a behavior wherein
the system fault occurs a short time after the sensor fault.
Providing behavior examples that violate this requirement can
help to pinpoint the cause of system-level faults.
Requirement R5: The vehicle should not do excessive
braking unnecessarily or too often.
This is a system-level performance (driving comfort) re-
quirement, in that it requires that the system not brake un-
necessarily or too often, thereby causing discomfort for the
passengers:
R5 = 
(
¬[0,t1](B ∧ ¬FC)∧
¬(B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2](B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2]B↓))),
Here, FC is a variable that is true when the Ego vehicle is
estimated to collide in the future with another object in the
environment, based on a simplified model of future behaviors.
The simplified model that we use for future trajectory estima-
tion is the Constant Turn Rate and Velocity (CTRV) model
[56]. The proposition B represents that the amount of braking
force applied by the controller exceeds half of the available
braking force. Finally, B↓ = B ∧©¬B represents the event
of releasing the brake, i.e., a true value of B followed by a
false value in the next sample.
To understand the meaning of requirement R5, consider the
following part of the requirement:

(
¬[0,t1](B ∧ ¬FC)
)
,
which requires that the system not apply excessive braking
for more than a specific amount of time (t1) while there is no
collision predicted. This essentially stipulates that the system
should not unnecessarily brake for a prolonged amount of time.
Next, consider the second part of requirement R5:

(
¬(B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2](B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2]B↓))),
which indicates that there should not be an “on-off” behavior,
followed by another “on-off” behavior, followed by a third
“on-off” behavior, with less than t2 between each other. This
essentially requires that the brakes not be applied and released
too often. Thus, this is a riding comfort requirement.
B. Development Process Support
We describe how requirements R1 through R5 can be used
to support both the controller design and testing phases of the
development process. For all of the requirements, any detected
violation (falsification) should be linked back to the conditions
that caused the violation.
Consider the first requirement, R1, “The vehicle should
not collide with an object”: if the vehicle does collide with
an object, then we would go back and see what conditions
caused such an event, for example, whether the vehicle speed
trace exhibited an anomaly or whether the vehicle was moving
erratically. Testing for collision avoidance is well established
in the field of ADAS. Often inflatable and other destructible
targets are employed; for example, see [57] and Fig. 6.
In the requirement “Sensor should detect visible obstacles”,
we focus on the detection of an obstacle as operational
imperative. If the sensor fails to detect the object within a time
interval, then the requirement is violated. This is essentially
a sensor-level requirement (visible but not detected), and test
engineers can set a real-world experiment to verify it relatively
easy because it is decoupled from others (one-term inequality,
sensor by sensor).
The requirement ”Localization error should not be too high
for too long” is important to verify (falsify) for both ego-
location and position identification of other agents in the
Fig. 6: Robotic pedestrian surrogate target with a Toyota
autonomous vehicle.
environment. Placing an ego-vehicle in the correct pose on the
road is usually not achieved by simply relying on GPS signal
processing, due to the GPS tendency to “jump” unpredictably,
but instead by estimating and dynamically refining the pose
through landmark observations, such as road edges, vertical
elements such as light poles, and signs. Assuming that the
ego-vehicle localization is done with sufficient accuracy, the
remaining task of localization is to make sure that the location
of other agents, especially those in the planned path of the ego
vehicle, are estimated with sufficient accuracy. Often a grid-
based representation centered on the ego-vehicle is employed
(e.g., [58]). Estimating E(i, s) in R3 is not trivial, but practical
approaches exist that can be used by test engineers (e.g., [59]).
The requirement “A sensor-related fault should not lead to a
system-level fault” is a form of robustness requirement. This
is similar to a requirement that the system should have no
“single point of failure”, which enforces that the failure of
any single component will not cause the system to fail (for
example, see [60]). We make an important clarification which
is practical but limiting in scope: no failure should occur
within the specified (short) time after the fault. Test engineers
could readily use examples of behavior provided in the course
of falsifying this requirement.
Lastly, the requirement “The vehicle should not brake too
often” is an example of a possible set of requirements designed
to establish how comfortable the ride in the vehicle is. It is
known that autonomous vehicles could induce motion sickness
in passengers if the vehicle control system does not comply
with human physiology [61], [62]. A better requirement may
well be developed using fuzzy set theory and further refined
for a specific target group of passengers (e.g., elderly people).
An alternative requirement could be defined by counting
the number of occurrences of an event within a total time
period, instead of relating one occurrence to another. Such a
requirement can be defined as a Timed Propositional Temporal
Logic (TPTL) specification. TPTL is a generalization of STL
which is also supported in our framework [63].
V. SIM-ATAV FRAMEWORK
We describe Sim-ATAV, a framework for performing testing
and analysis of autonomous driving systems in a virtual
environment. The framework is publicly available as an add-
on to S-TaLiRo [24]:
https://sites.google.com/a/asu.edu/s-taliro/s-taliro/sim-atav
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Fig. 7: Overview of the simulation environment.
The simulation environment used in Sim-ATAV is based on
the open source simulator Webots [64] and includes a vehicle
perception system, a vehicle controller, and a model of the
physical environment. The perception system processes data
from three sensor systems: CCD camera images, lidar, and
radar. The framework uses freely available and low cost tools
and can be run on a standard desktop PC. Later, we demon-
strate how Sim-ATAV can be used to implement traditional
testing approaches, as well as advanced automated testing
approaches that were not previously possible using existing
frameworks.
Fig. 7 shows an overview of the simulation environment.
The environment consists of a Simulator and a Vehicle Control
system. The Simulator contains models of the ego vehicle,
agents, and other objects in the environment (e.g., roads,
buildings). The Simulator outputs sensor data to the Vehicle
Control system. The sensor data includes representations of
CCD camera, lidar, and radar data. Simple models of the
sensors are used to produce the sensor data. For example,
synthetic CCD camera images are rendered by the Simulation
system, as if they came from a camera mounted on the
front of the ego vehicle. The Vehicle Control system contains
models of the Perception System, which performs sensor data
processing and sensor fusion. The Controller uses the output
of the Perception System to make decisions about how to
actuate the AV system. Actuation commands are sent from
the Controller to the Simulator.
Simulations proceed iteratively. At each instant, sensor data
is processed by the Vehicle Control, which then makes an
actuation decision. The actuation decision is then transmitted
back to the Simulator, which uses the actuation commands to
update the physics for the next time instant. This process is
repeated until a designated time limit has been reached.
The Vehicle Control system is implemented in Python. We
use simplified algorithms to implement the subsystems of the
vehicle control, which is sufficient in this case, as the purpose
of this investigation is to evaluate new testing methodologies
and not to evaluate a real AV control design; however, we
note that it is straightforward to replace our algorithms with
production versions to test real control designs.
To process CCD image data, we use a lightweight DNN,
SqueezeDet, which performs object detection and classifica-
tion [12]. SqueezeDet is implemented in TensorFlowTM[65],
and it outputs a list of object detection boxes with correspond-
ing class probabilities. This network was originally trained
on real image data from the KITTI dataset [11] to achieve
accuracy comparable to the popular AlexNet classifier [17].
We further train this network on the virtual images generated
in our framework. Fig. 8 shows an example output from
SqueezeDet, based on a synthetic image produced by our
simulator. The image shows two vehicles correctly detected
and classified, along with a portion of a shadow that is
incorrectly classified as a vehicle.
Fig. 8: Outputs from the SqueezeDet DNN, based on a
synthesized camera image.
To process lidar point cloud data, we first cluster the
received points based on their positions using the DBSCAN
algorithm [66], [67]. Then, we estimate the existence and
types of the objects based on how well the dimensions of
the clusters match with the dimensions of expected object
types such as pedestrians or cars. For estimating the object
type in the received radar targets, we use the radar signal
power. We implement a simple sensor fusion algorithm that
relates and merges the object detections from camera, lidar,
and radar with a simple logic. Our sensor fusion algorithm
makes some rule-based decisions, such as if the object type
can be recognized by the camera, discard the type estimations
done by the lidar and radar, and on the other hand if radar
or lidar is able to detect to position of the object, discard
the position estimations computed by the camera. It also
utilizes the expected current positions of previously detected
objects. A simple implementation of an unscented Kalman
filter is used to estimate the current and future trajectories of
the objects using the CTRV (Constant Turn Rate and Velocity)
model [68], [56].
Fig. 9 illustrates outputs from the sensor fusion system.
In the figure, the solid yellow box in the middle represents
the Ego vehicle. Yellow circles in front of the ego vehicle
represent the estimated future trajectory of the Ego vehicle.
Small white dots represent lidar point cloud data. The colored
dots and rectangles represent detected objects, with their
estimated orientation indicated with a white line in front of
Fig. 9: Sensor fusion outputs.
them. Expected future positions of agent vehicles with respect
to the ego vehicle are represented by red circles.
Our simple planner receives as inputs the high level target
path and target speed, and the outputs of the sensor fusion and
trajectory estimation modules. It assigns collision risk level to
the target objects with a simple logic and outputs the risk
assessments and a target speed, which depends on the target
speed of the mission or other factors, such as the distance to
a sharp turn ahead.
Our control algorithm implements simple path and speed
tracking and collision avoidance features. The controller re-
ceives the outputs of the planner. When there is no collision
risk, the controller drives the car with the target speed and
on the target path. When a future collision with an object is
predicted, it applies the brakes at a level proportional with the
risk assigned to the object.
The environment modeling framework is implemented in
Webots [64], a robotic simulation framework that models the
physical behavior of robotic components, such as manipu-
lators and wheeled robots, and can be configured to model
autonomous driving scenarios. In addition to modeling the
physics, a graphics engine is used to produce images of the
scenarios. In Sim-ATAV, the images rendered by Webots are
configured to correspond to the image data captured from a
virtual camera that is attached to the front of a vehicle.
The process used by Sim-ATAV for test generation and
execution for discrete and discretized continuous parameters
is illustrated by the flowchart shown in Fig. 10-(a). Sim-
ATAV first generates test cases that correspond to scenarios
defined in the simulation environment using covering arrays
as a combinatorial test generation approach. The scenario setup
is communicated to the simulation interface using TCP/IP
sockets. After a simulation is executed, the corresponding
simulation trace is received via socket communication and
evaluated using a cost function. Among all discrete test cases,
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Fig. 10: Flowcharts illustrating the combinatorial testing (a)
and falsification (b) approaches.
the most promising one is used as the initial test case for the
falsification process shown in Fig. 10-(b). For falsification, the
result obtained from the cost function is used in an optimiza-
tion setting to generate the next scenario to be simulated. For
this purpose, we used S-TaLiRo [24], which is a MATLABr
toolbox for falsification of CPSs. Similar tools, such as Breach
[69], can also be used in our framework for the same purpose.
VI. TESTING APPLICATION
In this section, we present an evaluation of our Sim-ATAV
framework using three separate driving scenarios. The scenar-
ios are selected to be both challenging for the autonomous
driving system and also analogous to plausible driving scenar-
ios experienced in real-world situations. In general, the system
designers will need to identify crucial driving scenarios, based
on intuition about challenging situations, from the perspec-
tive of the autonomous vehicle control system. A thorough
simulation-based testing approach will include a wide array
of scenarios that exemplify critical driving situations.
For each of the following scenarios, we consider a subset of
the requirements presented in Sec. IV and describe how to use
the results to enhance the development process. We conclude
the section with a summary of the results.
Scenario 1
The first scene that we consider is a straightaway section
of a two-lane road, as illustrated in Fig. 11. Several cars are
parked on the right-hand side of the road, and a pedestrian is
jay-walking in front of one of the cars, passing in front of the
Ego car from right to left. We call this driving scenario model
M1. The scenario simulates a similar setup to the Euro NCAP
Vulnerable Road User (VRU) protection test protocols [4].
Several aspects of the driving scenario are parameterized,
meaning that their values are fixed for any given simulation by
appropriately selecting the model parameters. The parameters
and initial conditions that we use for this scenario are:
• Initial speed of the Ego vehicle: [10, 30]m/s;
• Lateral position of Ego w.r.t its lane center: [−0.8, 0.8]m;
• Walking speed of the pedestrian: [1.5, 6]m/s;
• The model of Agent car, which is next to the pedestrian:
from 5 different vehicle models;
Ego
Agent
Fig. 11: Overview of the scenario 1.
• R, G, B values for the colors of Agent car: [0, 1];
• R, G, B values for the pedestrian’s shirt and pants: [0, 1].
We chose the parameterized aspects of the scenarios such
that their specific combinations would be challenging to a
DNN-based pedestrian detection system that relies on CCD
camera images, e.g., some combinations of agent vehicle shape
and color with pedestrian clothing colors may be challenging
to an object detection DNN. We also chose some of the param-
eter ranges, i.e, the vehicle and pedestrian speeds, so that the
scenario is physically challenging for the brake performance.
The Ego vehicle is longitudinally placed such that the time-to-
collision with the pedestrian will be 1.4s when the pedestrian
is exactly in front of the Ego vehicle (influenced by the Euro
NCAP, VRU protection test protocols [4]).
We evaluate Model M1 against three of the requirements
from Sec. IV: R1, R2, and R4. These include the system-level
requirement, the sensor-level requirements, and the sensor-to-
system-level requirement. We use this collection of require-
ments for Model M1 to demonstrate how we can automatically
identify each type of behavior using our framework.
Scenario 2
The next scenario involves a left turn maneuver by the ego
vehicle in a controlled intersection, as illustrated in Fig. 12.
An agent vehicle (Agent 1) in the opposing lane unexpectedly
passes through the intersection, against a red light, potentially
causing a collision with the Ego vehicle. There is also another
agent car (Agent 2), which is making a legal left turn from
the opposing lane. It is incumbent on the Ego vehicle to take
action to avoid colliding with the agent vehicles. We call the
model of this scenario M2.
For this experiment, we choose parameters such that the
position of Agent 2, or trajectory followed by Agent 1, in
combination with the behavior of the Ego, may result in
poor performance from the sensor processing or trajectory
estimation systems. For this scenario the search space is:
• Ego vehicle initial speed: [20, 30]m/s;
• Ego vehicle initial distance to the intersection:
[80, 160]m;
• Agent 1 initial distance to the intersection: [50, 100]m;
• Agent 1 target speed (initial, when approaching the
intersection, when inside the intersection): [10, 35]m/s;
• Agent 1 lateral position w.r.t its lane center (initial, when
approaching the intersection, inside the intersection):
[−0.75, 0.75]m;
• Agent 2 lateral position w.r.t its lane center:
[−0.75, 0.75]m;
• Agent 2 speed: [3, 15]m/s;
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Fig. 12: Overview of the scenario 2.
• Agent 2 initial distance to the intersection: [50, 100]m.
We evaluate Model M2 against requirement R4. The idea
in using the sensor-to-system-level requirement is that it is
relatively easy, in general, to find behaviors that result in
a collision for Model M2, but many collision cases are not
interesting for the designers. This could be because, for ex-
ample, the agent car is moving too quickly for the ego vehicle
to avoid. This would be a behavior that is not necessarily
caused by any specific incorrect behavior on the part of the
ego vehicle. Instead, we use R4 to identify behaviors where
there is a collision that is directly correlated to unacceptable
performance from the sensor processing system. These are
cases where the sensor data processing or future trajectory
estimation system is at fault for the collision. Such cases can
be easily used to debug specific aspects of the ego vehicle
control algorithms.
Scenario 3
In this last scenario, the ego vehicle is making a left turn
through an intersection, while an agent vehicle in the opposing
lane is also making a left turn. This scene is similar to the
Scenario 2, as depicted in Fig. 12, except that Agent 1 is
not present in this scenario, only Agent 2, which we refer to
as the agent vehicle for this scenario. If both ego and agent
vehicles are not accurately regulating their trajectories during
this maneuver, a collision may occur. We call the model of
this scenario M3.
In this scenario, we search over target trajectories of the ego
and agent vehicles. Below are the parameters that we use:
• Ego vehicle initial speed: [15, 30]m/s;
• Ego target lateral position w.r.t its lane center when
entering the intersection: [−1, 1]m, longitudinal starting
position of the left turn w.r.t. intersection entry point:
[−1, 10]m, target lateral position w.r.t its lane center when
exiting the the intersection: [−1, 1]m, end position of the
left turn w.r.t. intersection exit point: [−1, 10]m;
• Agent vehicle speed: [15, 30]m/s, target lateral posi-
tion w.r.t its lane center when entering the intersection:
[−1, 1]m, longitudinal starting position of the left turn
w.r.t. intersection entry point: [−1, 10]m, target lateral
position w.r.t its lane center when exiting the the inter-
section: [−1, 1]m, and the end position of the left turn
w.r.t. intersection exit point: [−1, 10]m.
We evaluate Model M3 against requirement R5. The pur-
pose of considering the performance requirement R5 in this
case, is that scenario M3 is difficult to falsify. That is, due
to the specific parameter ranges selected for the scenario, it
is unlikely that the ego vehicle will collide with the agent
vehicle. Instead, in this case, we are interested in identifying
situations where the emergency braking system unnecessarily
decelerates the ego vehicle, causing unacceptable performance,
from a ride-quality perspective. The scenario can easily lead to
unnecessary braking, as the ego and agent vehicles momentar-
ily move toward each other during their left turn maneuvers,
which can cause the emergency braking algorithm to decide,
incorrectly, that a collision is imminent. Such cases can be a
useful feedback to designers, as they can highlight behaviors
that are too conservative at the expense of ride quality.
Summary of Test Results
We present results from experiments demonstrating the
application of our framework to the scenarios and requirements
described above. Table I summarizes the results. For each case
study, Table I indicates the requirements used to test each
model, the testing approach used, the set of active sensors
used, and a summary of the results. We discuss the test
generation outcomes in detail below.
Covering array and falsification on Model M1: In our
previous work [23], we proposed and studied the effectiveness
of a testing approach that first uses covering arrays to discover
critical regions, based on a set of discrete parameters, then
uses those results as the initial points for robustness guided
falsification. Here, we apply that approach on model M1 for
3 different requirements, R1, R2 and R4. In model M1, we
focus on the camera sensor and DNN-based object detection
and classification algorithm. Because of this, most of our
parameters are colors of pedestrian clothing and the agent
vehicle, to which an object detection system may be sensitive
to as described in Sec. IV.
We create a mixed-strength covering array from a dis-
cretization of the parameterized variables. We choose a 3-
way covering of the parameters ego vehicle initial speed,
ego vehicle lateral position, pedestrian speed, agent vehicle
model as they are intuitively the most critical parameters for
the collision avoidance performance, and a 2-way covering
of the other parameters. These settings result in 195 covering
array tests generated by the ACTS tool [54]. Depending on the
time budget for the testing, the strength of the covering array
parameters can be changed, which can drastically increase or
decrease the number of discrete test cases in the generated
covering array. We first execute the resulting 195 covering
array tests and collect simulation trajectories. Then, we
compute the robustness values for those trajectories, with
respect to the requirements R1, R2 and R4. Finally, for each
requirement, starting from the case with the smallest positive
robustness value, we try to find as many additional falsifica-
tions as possible, within a maximum of 300 extra simulations,
by using a falsification approach that uses simulated annealing
to perform the optimization.
For requirement R1, 67 cases were falsified from the
covering array tests (i.e., 67 of the 195 cases did not satisfy
R1). Starting from 7 of the remaining (non-falsifying) cases
from the covering array tests, 5 additional falsifying cases were
discovered using falsification. For requirement R2, 65 cases
were falsified from the covering array cases, with an additional
8 cases discovered during the falsification step. For require-
ment R4, 67 cases were falsified during the covering array
step, with 12 more cases discovered during the falsification
step.
These results demonstrate that we can automatically identify
test cases that violate specific sensor-level, system-level, and
sensor-to-system level requirements. These test cases can be
fed back to the designers to improve the perception or control
design or can be used as guidance to identify challenging
scenarios to be used during the testing phase.
Analysis of robustness values on the falsification of Model
M2: The robustness value, which is described in Sec. III, for
a trajectory with respect to the requirement is automatically
computed in Sim-ATAV. This computation is performed by the
S-TaLiRo tool [24] and is used to guide the test cases towards
a falsification.
We use the results of falsification on Model M2 to show, in
Fig. 13, how the robustness value changes over time and finally
becomes negative, which indicates falsification of the require-
ment. In this case, Sim-ATAV was able to find a falsifying
example in 58 simulations. Because the cost function gradients
are not computable, we use a stochastic global optimization
technique, Simulated Annealing (SA). The blue line shows the
robustness value for each simulation. We can observe that the
robustness value per simulation run is not monotonic. This
is due to the stochastic nature of the optimizer; however, the
achieved minimum robustness up to the current simulation is
a non-increasing function, which shows the best robustness
achieved after each simulation. As soon as the framework finds
a test case that causes a negative robustness value, it stops the
search and reports the falsifying example.
Fig. 14 shows images from the simulation execution of a
falsifying example for model M2 with respect to the require-
ment R2. Between the time corresponding to Fig. 14-(a) to
Fig. 14-(b), the red car approaching from the opposite side is
driving on a path such that there will be a future collision with
the Ego vehicle. However, due to incorrect localization of the
agent vehicle, the Ego vehicle is not able to correctly predict
the future trajectory of the agent vehicle, and so it does not
predict a collision. Hence, it continues without taking action
Model M1 Model M2 Model M3
Requirement R1 R2 R4 R4 R5
Testing
Modality
CA+
Falsification
CA+
Falsification
CA+
Falsification Falsification Falsification
Active Sensors CCD CCD CCD CCD, Radar, LIDAR CCD, LIDAR
Computation
Time
CA: 2h, 10min.
2h, 3min. 9h, 40min.
Fals.:3h, 33min. 3h, 35min. 3h 34min.
No.
Simulations
CA: 195
58 232
Fals.:300 300 300
Falsification
Obtained
67 by CA + 65 by CA + 67 by CA +
5 by falsification 8 by falsification 12 by falsification
Application
of Results
Lowest robustness cases used to create critical tests. Falsifying cases relate to
processing of specific sensor; aids
in controller design improvement.
Poor performance cases used to
improve controller design in
modeling phase.
TABLE I: Results from autonomous driving tests using virtual framework.
Fig. 13: Robustness guided falsification utilizes global opti-
mization techniques to guide the test cases toward falsification.
to avoid the collision. Starting from the moment shown on
Fig. 14-(c), the Ego vehicle predicts the collision and starts
applying emergency braking; however, because it takes action
too late, the Ego vehicle cannot avoid a collision with the
agent vehicle, as shown in Fig. 14-(d).
We note that, even for cases that are non-falsifying, the
robustness values are useful for the system designer’s analysis,
as behaviors with low robustness value are “close to” violating
the requirement and, therefore, correspond to cases that may
require closer attention.
A visual analysis of a falsifying simulation trajectory from
Model M3: As presented in Table I, Sim-ATAV was able to
find a falsifying example for model M3 with respect to the
STL requirement R5 in 232 simulations. We present a visual
analysis of the falsifying test result. Note that this analysis
is done automatically in the framework, and corresponding
satisfaction/falsification of the requirement is returned to the
user, along with the robustness value that shows the signed
distance to the boundary of satisfaction or falsification. The
type of visual analysis we present here may be useful for
the system designers to understand the reason behind the
falsification (or satisfaction) of a requirement, which can
be helpful for debugging or improving the design. For this
analysis, we use the definitions and notation introduced in
Section IV.
Fig. 15 shows a part of the simulation trajectory of Model
M3 for a time window around the falsification instance,
together with the corresponding logic evaluations of the pred-
icates related to the subformulas in Requirement R5. In the
top plot in Fig. 15, the red solid line is the estimated future
minimum distance between the ego vehicle and Agent vehicle
1, with respect to the simulation time. This estimation is
based on the ground truth information collected from the
simulation and utilizes the CTRV model at each time step
of the simulation to compute the collision estimate that is
described in R5. For this example, we define the variable FC
that is used in R5 as (df,min < 0.5), where df,min represents
the expected minimum future distance. The dashed horizontal
red line in Fig. 15 located at 0.5m is the threshold minimum
future distance for a collision prediction. The values of t1 and
t2 are respectively defined as 0.6 and 0.5 in this example.
Since df,min is never less than 0.5 in this case, the collision
estimation variable FC, which is represented by the black
solid line in the top plot, is always false.
The middle plot presents a similar evaluation for computing
the variable B used in R5, which represents excessive braking.
This evaluation uses the collected actual normalized brake
power data, say br, from the simulation and computes the
logical variable B = (br > 0.5). The solid and dashed red
lines represent br and the threshold value 0.5, respectively.
The solid black line shows the value of B with respect to time.
The bottom plot in Fig. 15 shows the value of the variable
B↓ that is defined for the requirement R5 with respect to the
simulation time.
The first part of the requirement R5, which was defined as

(
¬[0,t1](B∧¬FC)
)
in Section IV, would evaluate to false
if and only if there exists a time window of t1 such that B is
always true and FC is always false. Focusing on the values
of FC and B from the top two plots in Fig. 15, we can see
that although FC is always false, because there is no time
window of t1 = 0.6s in which B is always true, the first part
of the requirement evaluates to true. This means this execution
of model M3 satisfies the first part of the requirement R5.
The second part of the requirement R5, which is defined
as 
(
¬(B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2](B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2]B↓))) evaluates to false if
and only if there exists a series of three brake releases (B↓),
such that one occurrence of B↓ follows another within a t2
time window. As we see in the bottom plot of Fig. 15, at
time 5.6s it is true that there exists B↓ and it is also true that
there exists another B↓ within the time window of 0 to 0.5s
following this moment (occurring at 5.85s). Hence, the inner
(B↓ ∧ ♦(0,t2]B↓) inside the above formula evaluates to true
at time 5.6s. If we call this event e1, the overall formula will
evaluate to false if there exists an B↓ that is followed by event
e1 in a time window between 0 and t2 = 0.5s. This happens
at time 5.46s, which is the moment that there exists an B↓
followed by event e1 at 0.14 ∈ (0, 0.5], where the event e1 is
defined as an B↓ followed by another B↓ within t ∈ (0, 0.5].
Hence, the second part of the requirement R5 evaluates to
false, and as a result, R5 evaluates to false at time 5.46s,
since it is a conjunction of parts 1 and 2. In other words, the
system falsifies (does not satisfy) the requirement R5.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated a simulation-based adversarial test gen-
eration framework for autonomous vehicles. The framework
works in a closed-loop fashion, where the system evolves in
time with the feedback cycles from the autonomous vehicle’s
controller. The framework includes models of lidar and radar
sensor behaviors, as well as a model of the CCD camera sensor
inputs. CCD camera images are rendered synthetically by
our framework and processed using a pre-trained deep neural
network (DNN). Using our framework, we demonstrated a new
effective way of finding a critical vehicle behaviors by using
1) covering arrays to test combinations of discrete parameters
and 2) simulated annealing to find corner-cases.
Future work will include using identified counterexamples
to retrain and improve the DNN-based perception system,
e.g., [70]. Additionally, the scene rendering will be made
(a) Perception error (b) Perception error
(c) Emergency braking (d) Collision
Fig. 14: Time-ordered images from the falsifying example on
model M1.
Fig. 15: Analysis of falsification for Model M3.
more realistic by using other scene rendering tools, such
as those based on state-of-the-art game engines, e.g., [71].
Also, we note that the formal requirements that we consid-
ered were provided as an example of the type used when
employing a requirements-driven development approach based
on a temporal logic language, which is a formalism that may
be unfamiliar to many test engineers. Future research will
investigate ways to elicit formal requirements based for ADS
using visual specification languages, e.g., [72].
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